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RESPECTING THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION: A CALL FOR
PROVIDING MIRANDA WARNINGS IN
NON-CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS
Rinat Kitai-Sangero*

INTRODUCTION
Although the privilege against self-incrimination is recognized in
most countries, it has always been controversial. Many jurists and scholars have wondered whether the right is essential in an uncoerced interrogation.1 In the United States, however, the Supreme Court has held that it
is a fundamental right and essential to a fair trial.2 The seminal holding of
Miranda v. Arizona, that suspects in custody must be apprised of their
right to silence and counsel,3 represents the centrality of this right to
American jurisprudence.4

*
Senior Lecturer, The Academic Center of Law and Business, Ramat Gan,
Israel. I am grateful to Boaz Sangero, Nicole Banks, A.M. Goldstein, and the
participants of The Third International Conference on Evidence Law and Forensic
Science, held in Beijing, for their helpful comments.
1. Justice Harlan stated in his dissenting opinion in Miranda v. Arizona that
“[s]ociety has always paid a stiff price for law and order, and peaceful interrogation is
not one of the dark moments of the law.” 384 U.S. 436, 517 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In China, the law does not recognize the right to remain silent during interrogation, and no Miranda-type warnings are provided. Ira Belkin, China, in CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY 91–106 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2d ed., 2007);
Mark A. Godsey, Miranda’s Final Frontier—The International Arena: A Critical Analysis of United States v. Bin Laden, and a Proposal for a New Miranda Exception
Abroad, 51 DUKE L.J. 1703, 1710, 1764 (2002). Additionally, after the initial interrogation, the suspect should be advised of his or her right to counsel. Belkin, supra, at
97, 101; Godsey, supra at 1764 n.272.
2. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)
(stating that “[t]he privilege against self-incrimination ‘registers an important advance
in the development of our liberty—one of the great landmarks in man’s struggle to
make himself civilized.’ ”) (quoting Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426
(1956)).
3. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458.
4. The “Miranda warning” includes warnings to the suspect of his or her right
to remain silent, his or her right to consult with an attorney, either retained or appointed, and of the possibility that statements may be used in court. Id. at 444.
203
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Nevertheless, Miranda’s holding has been eroded over time as
courts have admitted evidence gained in the absence of the warnings.5 In
addition, police interrogators may employ various means to interrogate
suspects without providing Miranda warnings.6 Thus, “questioning
outside Miranda” has become a common phrase.7 One way of avoiding
the rigors of the Miranda holding is to interrogate a suspect in a prima
facie non-custodial setting.8 Indeed, some training materials advise interrogators to notify suspects that they are not under arrest when the suspects seem unlikely to cooperate or waive their rights so as to bypass the
conditions that trigger Miranda warnings.9
Under Miranda, suspects are entitled to receive the warnings only
when they are subject to a custodial interrogation.10 Interrogation is an
explicit questioning or its “functional equivalent” relating to words or behavior that the police officer should reasonably expect would extract an
incriminating confession from the suspect.11 The interrogation reflects an
element of coercion beyond that inherent in the very arrest.12 Custody is a
“formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.”13 Neither police suspicions against the suspect
nor the setting of the interrogation are material, in and of themselves, to

5. See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (permitting the collateral
use of non-Mirandized statements for impeachment purposes); Michigan v. Tucker,
417 U.S. 433 (1974) (admitting evidence derived from only partially Mirandized
statements).
6. Richard A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to Miranda: Modern Interrogators’ Strategies for Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84 MINN. L. REV.
397 (1999).
7. Charles D. Weisselberg, In the Stationhouse After Dickerson, 99 MICH. L.
REV. 1121, 1122 (2001) (quotations omitted).
8. See Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1519,
1542–43 (2008).
9. Id. at 1542–43; Emily Bretz, Note, Don’t Answer the Door: Montejo v. Louisiana Relaxes Police Restrictions for Questioning Non-Custodial Defendants, 109
MICH. L. REV. 221, 237–38 (2010).
10. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
11. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).
12. Id. at 300.
13. Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1224 (2010); see also Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994); Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 430 (1984); California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1121 (1983); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440
(1984).
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an assessment of whether Miranda warnings are required.14 Thus,
whether a suspect is in custody is an objective determination.15
The question of when a suspect is in custody, and thus when Miranda applies, has been raised in a number of contexts.16 For instance, the
U.S. Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit have addressed whether interrogation of incarcerated suspects requires a warning.17 In Mathis v. United
States, the U.S. Supreme Court arguably took the stance that prisoners
are per se in custody.18 However, the Court declared in 2010 in Maryland
v. Shatzer that “we have never decided whether incarceration constitutes
custody for Miranda purposes, and have indeed explicitly declined to address the issue.”19 In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in
the case of Howes v. Fields.20 Randall Lee Fields was questioned by police
interrogators on suspicion of child sex abuse.21 At the time, he was serving a sentence of forty-five days in the county jail for disorderly conduct.22
He was taken from his cell to a locked conference room in the prison
compound, but he was not handcuffed.23 The interrogators did not provide him with Miranda warnings.24 However, they informed him that if he
was not interested in cooperating, he was free to leave the room.25 In the
course of the interrogation, which lasted seven hours, Fields made incriminating statements that helped the prosecution gain his conviction in
court.26 The Michigan Court of Appeals upheld Field’s conviction, holding that Fields did not have to be provided with Miranda warnings because he had been in custody on a separate offense unrelated to the

14. Gordon Van Kessel, The Suspect as a Source of Testimonial Evidence: A
Comparison of the English and American Approaches, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 44 (1986).
15. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 421–22; Yarborough v. Alvardo, 541 U.S. 652, 662
(2004); see also Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 324.
16. Anne Elizabeth Link, Note, Fifth Amendment—The Constitutionality of
Custodial Confessions, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 878, 892 (1992).
17. For analysis of this issue see Laurie Magid, Questioning the Question-Proof
Inmate: Defining Miranda Custody for Incarcerated Suspects, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 883
(1997).
18. Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 4 (1968). The circuits, however, have not
adopted such a broad rule. See David C. Berg, Putting the Fifth Amendment Behind
Bars: United States v. Morales, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 455, 471 (1989).
19. Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1224 (2010).
20. 131 S. Ct. 1047 (2011).
21. Fields v. Howes, 617 F. 3d 813, 815 (6th Cir. 2010).
22. Id. at 816.
23. Id. at 815.
24. Id. at 816.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 815–16.
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interrogation.27 On petition for habeas corpus, the federal district court
reversed. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling that Miranda applied any time a suspect was isolated for interrogation from the
rest of the prison population.28
The question of what constitutes a custodial interrogation also arises
in traffic stops29 and Terry stops,30 as well as in various other situations.31
The fact that this question has arisen in a number of circumstances points
out that the line that the Supreme Court drew between custodial and
non-custodial interrogations is not as clear as the Court might think.
This article argues that although custodial interrogation entails inherent pressures that act to weaken a suspect’s will to resist, Miranda
should apply as soon as the interrogee has become the focal point of the
interrogation because there is no significant difference between custodial
and non-custodial interrogation in terms of the suspect’s ability to avoid
coercion. Actually, non-custodial interrogations pose similar risks for defendants that the Supreme Court attempted to address by requiring Miranda warnings. Announcing to suspects that they are not under arrest
and that they are free to end the interrogation whenever they want is not
enough to protect them from being compelled to talk. Furthermore, the
right to counsel, in addition to being an independent right, ensures the
right to remain silent not only in custodial interrogations, but also in
every situation in which a person is interrogated as a suspect. Without
counsel, the chances that a suspect will incriminate himself unwillingly
increase significantly.32 Finally, requiring Miranda warnings only in custodial settings subverts three strong rationales for the privilege against selfincrimination: casting the burden of proof upon the state, avoiding the
pooling effect,33 and protecting the innocent from wrongful conviction.

27. Id. at 818.
28. Id. at 822.
29. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
30. See Daniel R. Dinger, Is There A Seat for Miranda at Terry’s Table? An
Analysis of the Federal Circuit Court Split Over the Need for Miranda Warnings During Coercive Terry Detentions, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1467 (2010).
31. See, e.g., Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318 (1994); California v. Beheler,
463 U.S. 1121 (1983); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
32. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966).
33. See Daniel J. Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 430 (2000). The pooling-effect theory was developed by Daniel J. Seidmann and
Alex Stein. Under Seidmann and Stein’s theory, the right to silence indirectly protects
innocent accused persons. Id. at 449. “Pooling” occurs when guilty accused persons lie
rather than remain silent, thereby causing the erosion of the value of uncorroborated
exonerating statements made by innocent people. Id. at 433.
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Part I of this article briefly examines the impact of custodial detention on
the voluntariness of confessions. Part II describes how and why interrogation of suspects leads to securing confessions. Part III considers the role
of counsel both in safeguarding the innocent and in safeguarding the suspect from involuntary self-incrimination. Parts IV, V, and VI address the
three aforementioned rationales for the privilege against self-incrimination. The article concludes that administering Miranda warnings should
be part and parcel of every interrogation of a suspect.
I. CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS WEAKEN A
SUSPECT’S WILL
The Supreme Court assumed that the custody requirement would
separate an interrogation containing compelling pressure from one that
did not involve compelling pressure.34 The Miranda ruling was far-reaching. In stating firmly that interrogation in a custodial situation is by its
very nature coercive, the Court went beyond the traditional test for confessions that focused on the voluntariness of the statement.35 The Court
acknowledged that the environment of custodial interrogation is intended
to suppress the will of the suspect and might lead to an involuntary confession.36 Despite this assertion, the Court sought to allow police interrogation while safeguarding the individual’s autonomy through the warning
requirement.37 Miranda, therefore, did not proscribe custodial interrogations, but it did obligate the interrogators to inform suspects being questioned of their rights to remain silent and to consult with counsel.38 In the
absence of these guarantees, it is presumed that the confession was obtained coercively.39
A custodial setting can indeed break a suspect’s will power.40 Custody is a traumatic event. It isolates the suspect and does not allow him or
her contact with family or friends, who can provide strength to cope with

34. Weisselberg, supra note 8, at 1547.
35. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 462.
36. Id. at 457.
37. Steven Penney, Theories of Confession Admissibility: A Historical View, 25
AM. J. CRIM. L. 309, 348, 355, 366 (1998); Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, A Modest Proposal for the Abolition of Custodial Confessions, 68 N.C. L. REV.
69, 102 (1989).
38. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468–69.
39. Id. at 498.
40. Rinat Kitai-Sangero, Detention for the Purpose of Interrogation as Modern
“Torture,” 85 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 137, 147–48 (2008).

R
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the interrogation.41 It cuts off the suspect from the routine of life,42 a dislocation that causes feelings of isolation and anxiety, leading to the development of dependence on the interrogators.43 Isolation intensifies tension
and anxiety.44 By its very nature, custodial interrogation harms an individual’s autonomy.45 The suspect’s loss of autonomy makes it easier for interrogators to exert psychological pressure so that the suspect will cooperate
with them, especially through making a confession.46 In addition, difficult
custodial conditions, such as severe overcrowding and being locked inside
the cell most of the day with no sunlight, act to break the suspect’s willpower.47 Furthermore, custodial situations make it easier for the police to
employ tricks, such as exaggerating the nature and weight of the evidence
against the suspect, who is unable to verify such statements while under
arrest.48 It is no wonder, then, that custodial interrogations yield more
confessions than do interrogations conducted when the suspect is at liberty to leave.49 In such custodial situations, confessions cannot be thought
of as truly voluntary.50
Sociological and psychological studies on obedience theories shed
light on the dynamics of custodial interrogations. For instance, scholars
point to people’s reflexive inclination to obey the demands of those in

41. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 449–50, 455; Magid, supra note 17, at 928; Richard J.
Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and Irrational Action, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 979, 997 (1997); see also Rosenberg & Rosenberg,
supra note 37, at 110.
42. Magid, supra note 17, at 929.
43. Hagit Lernau, A Research Evaluation of the Israeli New Pretrial Detention
Act, 35 ISR. L. REV. 266, 267 (2001).
44. Barry C. Feld, Police Interrogation of Juveniles: An Empirical Study of Policy and Practice, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 219, 243 (2006).
45. Penney, supra note 37, at 359.
46. Mark Berger, Legislating Confession Law in Great Britain: A Statutory Approach to Police Interrogations, 24 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 1, 24 (1990)
47. Rinat Kitai-Sangero, Conditions of Confinement—The Duty to Grant the
Greatest Possible Liberty for Pretrial Detainees, 43 CRIM. L. BULL. 250, 267 (2007);
Lernau, supra note 43, at 267; Boaz Sangero, Miranda Is Not Enough: A New Justification for Demanding “Strong Corroboration” to a Confession, 28 CARDOZO L. REV.
2791, 2799 (2007).
48. Rinat Kitai-Sangero, Due Process at the Pretrial Detention Stage—What Will
Become of the Innocent?: A Call for Pretrial Discovery Rules, 46 CRIM. L. BULL. 452,
462–63 (2004). On these tricks, see Deborah Young, Unnecessary Evil: Police Lying in
Interrogations, 28 CONN. L. REV. 425, 429, 432 (2010).
49. For this data, see Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Dialogue on Miranda:
Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43
UCLA L. REV. 839, 872, 884 (1996).
50. Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 37, at 110–11.
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authority51 and how this inclination is strengthened in a custodial interrogation setting.52 Thus, police interrogation creates a psychological reality
in which suspects view themselves as being in a position of submission to
authority, similar to a slave.53 Suspects can behave irrationally because
they perceive themselves as having been placed in a situation demanding
blind obedience.54 This coercive state seriously affects their powers of
judgment.55
The Supreme Court stressed that “it was the compulsive aspect of
custodial interrogation, and not the strength or content of the government’s suspicions at the time the questioning was conducted, which led
the Court to impose the Miranda requirements with regard to custodial
questioning,”56 and that “the mere fact that an investigation has focused
on a suspect does not trigger the need for Miranda warnings in non-custodial settings.”57 Further, the Fifth Amendment guarantees that “no person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself . . . .”58 At first glance, a non-custodial interrogation does not appear compelling: “When a defendant is not in custody, he is in control,
and need only shut his door or walk away to avoid police badgering.”59
Quite simple on the face of it, or so it would seem. When not under arrest
or similar restraint, the suspect is not locked behind bars. He is not disconnected from family, friends, and life’s routine, and he is not incarcerated in a cell with malcontent inmates.
The U.S. Supreme Court itself recognized, however, that things are
not so simple, and that every interrogation of a person suspected of a
crime is a threatening situation.60 Nevertheless, the Court declined to expand Miranda to an interrogation that takes place in a non-custodial setting, holding that:

51. Adrian J. Barrio, Note, Rethinking Schneckloth v. Bustamonte: Incorporating Obedience Theory Into The Supreme Court’s Conception of Voluntary Consent,
1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 242 (1997).
52. Alan Hirsch, Threats, Promises, and False Confessions: Lessons of Slavery,
49 HOW. L.J. 31, 51 (2005).
53. Id. at 52–53.
54. Id. at 52.
55. Id. at 51–53.
56. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994) (quoting Beckwith v.
United States, 425 U.S. 341, 346-47 (1976)) (emphasis added).
57. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 431 (1984).
58. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
59. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2090 (2009).
60. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977).
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a noncustodial situation is not converted to one in which Miranda
applies simply because a reviewing court concludes that, even in
the absence of any formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement, the questioning took place in a “coercive environment.”
Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will
have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the
police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime. But police
officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question. Nor is the requirement of warnings to be
imposed simply because the questioning takes place in the station
house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police
suspect. Miranda warnings are required only where there has been
such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him “in custody.” It was that sort of coercive environment to which Miranda
by its terms was made applicable, and to which it is limited.61

It is likely true that interrogations that take place while suspects are not
in custody are easier for suspects than custodial interrogation. However,
every interrogation of suspects, regardless of whether the interrogation
takes place in a custodial or non-custodial situation, creates a risk of compelled self-incrimination. Such an interrogation is conducted with the
goal of extracting a confession, and is often accompanied by manipulation
and tricks. Thus, as will be argued below, for these reasons, Miranda
should come into play in every interrogation of a person as a suspect.
II. NON-CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS INVOLVE THE SAME
COERCIVE TACTICS AS CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS
Every interrogation of a suspect aimed at securing a confession contains inherently compelling pressures that might lead to self-incrimination, whether true or false, against the person’s will.62 A system that aims
to secure a confession creates “comfortable” conditions to achieve this
goal.
The privilege against self-incrimination notwithstanding, the criminal justice system values confessions.63 The Supreme Court held that “admissions of guilt are more than merely ‘desirable’ . . . they are essential to
society’s compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those

61. Id.
62. See also Bretz, supra note 9, at 239.
63. Laurie Magid, The Miranda Debate: Questions Past, Present, and Future, 36
HOUS. L. REV. 1251, 1255 (1999) (reviewing THE MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW, JUSTICE,
AND POLICING (Richard A. Leo & George C. Thomas III, eds. 1998)).

R
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who violate the law.”64 Interrogation is a central tool of the investigation
process,65 and suspects whom the interrogators consider guilty are interrogated in order to extract a confession.66 Upon securing a confession,
interrogators often cease the investigation and consider the case closed.67
In England, interrogations of suspects in custody were prohibited until
1964.68 In contrast, custodial interrogations were a common practice in
the United States, and accordingly coercive tactics were developed, and
guidebooks written about extracting confessions.69
There are a number of reasons that an interrogation focuses on
seeking a confession. The suspect is available, sitting before the interrogator in the police station. Hence, a lazy interrogator does not have to look
too deeply for incriminating evidence.70 Convincing the suspect to confess
is a fast, cheap way to resolve a crime.71 Sometimes the police cannot
64. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986).
65. Lissa Griffin, The Correction of Wrongful Convictions: A Comparative Perspective, 16 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1241, 1248 (2001); Raymond J. Toney, English
Criminal Procedure Under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights:
Implications for Custodial Interrogation Practices, 24 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 411, 426
(2002); Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards Against
Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105, 136 (1997).
66. Stephen A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in
the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C.L. REV. 891, 911 (2004); Seth Goldberg, Missouri v.
Seibert: The Multifactor Test Should Be Replaced with a Bright-Line Warning Rule to
Strengthen Miranda’s Clarity, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1287, 1292 (2005); Sangero, supra
note 47, at 2815.
67. Cheryl G. Bader, “Forgive Me Victim for I Have Sinned”: Why Repentance
and the Criminal Justice System Do Not Mix—A Lesson from Jewish Law, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 69, 78 (2003); Drizin & Leo, supra note 66, at 922; Talia Fisher &
Issachar Rosen-Zvi, The Confessional Penalty, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 871, 879 (2008);
Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation,
88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 440 (1998); Ofshe & Leo, supra note 41, at 984;
Sangero, supra note 47, at 2815, 2821.
68. DAVID WOLCHOVER & ANTHONY HEATON-ARMSTRONG, ON CONFESSION
EVIDENCE 65–66 (1996). But see Van Kessel, supra note 14, at 84 (stating that the
police generally ignored the prohibition against questioning of suspects in custody).
69. WOLCHOVER & HEATON-ARMSTRONG, supra note 68, at 66.
70. Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 17
(1910) (citing Sir James Stephen who said, “it is far pleasanter to sit comfortably in
the shade rubbing red pepper into a poor devil’s eyes than to go about in the sun
hunting up evidence.”); Young, supra note 48, at 473.
71. See David Morgan & Geoffrey M. Stephenson, Introduction: The Right to
Silence in Criminal Investigations, in DAVID MORGAN & GEOFFREY M. STEPHENSON,
SUSPICION AND SILENCE: THE RIGHT TO SILENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 13
(David Morgan & Geoffrey M. Stephenson eds. 1994); Ronald J. Allen, The Misguided Defenses of Miranda v. Arizona, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 205, 214 (2007) (extol-
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resolve a crime without a confession.72 Confessions provide information
regarding all the surrounding circumstances of the offense.73 They may
also be necessary to uncover other crimes committed by the suspect.74
Additionally, confession evidence is prejudicial75 because it emanates from the accused person himself or herself.76 The power of a confession stems from the assumption that people do not speak falsely against
their own interests, and do not say bad things about themselves unless
true.77 If one admits to being an offender, then he or she presumably committed the offense.78 Additionally, by confessing, the suspect claims his or
her own guilt, and thereby relieves the burden placed upon decision-makers and fact-finders. “Supposedly, by confessing, the accused is ritualistically accepting and submitting to all investigative and trial proceedings
initiated against him, in particular, and submitting to the victorious society with which he is engaged in a duel, in general.”79
Confessions play a major role in criminal proceedings generally and
in the interrogation process in particular.80 The criminal justice system is
actually “addicted to confessions.”81 Many suspects make full or partial

ling interrogation for this reason); Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 67, at 874; Sangero,
supra note 47, at 2815; see also White, supra note 65, at 133; Young, supra note 48, at
473.
72. Magid, supra note 17, at 930; White, supra note 65, at 136.
73. See Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 67, at 874.
74. Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year
Perspective on Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1055, 1064 (1998).
75. Mandy DeFilippo, You Have the Right to Better Safeguards: Looking Beyond Miranda in the New Millennium, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 637, 663, 672–73
(2001); see also Leo & Ofshe, supra note 67, at 429; Ofshe & Leo, supra note 41, at
983–84; Sangero, supra note 47, at 2815.
76. See Fischer & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 67, at 874; Alberto B. Lopez, $10 and a
Denim Jacket? A Model Statute for Compensating the Wrongfully Convicted, 36 GA.
L. REV. 665, 682 (2002).
77. Fischer & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 67, at 874; see also Christopher B. Mueller,
Tales Out of School—Spillover Confessions and Against Interest Statements Naming
Others, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 929, 932 (2001).
78. See Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 67, at 874; Richard A. Leo & Richard J.
Ofshe, Missing the Forest for the Trees: A Response to Paul Cassell’s “Balanced Approach” to the False Confession Problem, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 1135, 1143 (1997)
(stating that “[t]he conventional wisdom that people do not confess to crimes they did
not commit and that the American criminal justice system does not wrongfully convict
innocents permits these injustices to occur.”).
79. Sangero, supra note 47, at 2816.
80. See Fischer & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 67, at 874.
81. Id. at 893 (quotations omitted).
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admissions of guilt against their interests.82 The evidentiary weight attached to confessions made during police interrogation is controversial.83
In the past, there was a clear preference for confessions over other kinds
of evidence.84 Today, many continue to treat a confession of guilt during
interrogation as the “queen of evidence,”85 even in the face of a denial of
guilt in court and evidence of innocence.86 “[T]he confession is a unique
type of evidence that blinds both juries and judges.”87 According to this
view, the confession is perceived as reliable evidence because an innocent
and rational person’s confession, when there is no torture or other extreme condition, is counterintuitive.88 Furthermore, it is assumed that a
confession normally emanates from strong feelings of guilt and from a
desire to get things off the chest.89
On the other hand, some view confessions in police interrogations
with suspicion precisely because they act against a suspect’s interests, ex-

82. See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 49, at 842 (one-third of the suspects confess); see also JIM DWYER, PETER NEUFELD & BARRY SCHECK, ACTUAL INNOCENCE
90 (2000) (about seventy-five percent of suspects make incriminating statements);
LARRY LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW 171 (2006); WOLCHOVER &
HEATON-ARMSTRONG, supra note 68, at 87–88; Cassell & Fowles, supra note 74, at
1062; John D. Jackson, Silence and Proof: Extending the Boundaries of Criminal Proceedings in the United Kingdom, 5 INT’L J. OF EVID. & PROOF 145, 162 (2001) (in
England fifty-five percent of suspects confess to their guilt); Arne F. Soldwedel, Testing Japan’s Convictions: the Lay Judge System and the Rights of Criminal Defendants,
41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1417, 1433 (2008) (in Japan ninety percent of suspects
confess); Van Kessel, supra note 14, at 110 (stating that “[t]he vast majority of English
suspects talk, and most make a confession or admission”).
83. See Van Kessel, supra note 14, at 4–6.
84. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRIME IN THE RENAISSANCE 186 (1974)
(regarding Germany in the sixteenth century); Richard K. Sherwin, Dialects and
Dominance: A Study of Rhetorical Fields in the Law of Confessions, 136 U. PA. L.
REV. 729, 750 (1988).
85. Fischer & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 67, at 872; Sangero, supra note 47, at 2794.
86. DWYER, NEUFELD & SCHECK, supra note 82, at 92; Steven B. Duke, Does
Miranda Protect the Innocent or the Guilty?, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 551, 568 (2007); Kevin
Jon Heller, The Cognitive Psychology of Circumstantial Evidence, 105 MICH. L. REV.
241, 250 (2006); Fischer & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 67, at 880; Leo & Ofshe, supra note
67, at 482; Van Kessel, supra note 14, at 119–20.
87. Sangero, supra note 47, at 2810.
88. Steven A. Drizin & Marissa J. Reich, Heeding the Lessons of History: The
Need for Mandatory Recording of Police Interrogations to Accurately Assess the Reliability and Voluntariness of Confessions, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 619, 637 (2004); Fischer &
Rosen-Zvi, supra note 67, at 881; Hirsch, supra note 52, at 33.
89. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 55 (1895); The King v. Warickshall,
(1783) 168 Eng. Rep. 234 (K.B.) 235.

R

R

R
R

R
R

R
R
R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\42-1\NMX105.txt

214

unknown

Seq: 12

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

11-JUN-12

12:49

[Vol. 42

posing them to shame, conviction, and punishment.90 Confessing to guilt,
in this view, normally emanates from pressures that overbear the free will
of the suspect because a rational suspect would not make a confession
unless it came in the face of irrefutable evidence or in exchange for mitigation of the punishment.91 The frequency with which defendants against
whom the evidence is weak are full of remorse in the police station, yet
overcome their “pangs of conscience” at trial, casts further doubt on the
validity of confessions during police interrogation.92 Far from the queen
of evidence, in this view, a confession is the “empress of wrongful
convictions.”93
Despite this ambivalence among scholars, a confession in the police
station commonly leads to conviction.94 Except for catching a person
“red-handed” or having a videotape of the crime, a confession is the most
incriminating and convincing evidence.95 As the Supreme Court held that:
A confession is like no other evidence . . . the defendant’s own
confession is probably the most probative and damaging evidence
that can be admitted against him . . . . [T]he admissions of a defendant come from the actor himself, the most knowledgeable and
unimpeachable source of information about his past conduct. Certainly, confessions have profound impact on the jury, so much so
that we may justifiably doubt its ability to put them out of mind
even if told to do so.96

Hence, although a confession may be beneficial to the soul, it is detrimental to the defense.97 It is no wonder that police interrogators are highly
motivated to obtain this piece of evidence.98 The vast majority of confessions are obtained during interrogations and are not the result of sponta90. David A. Wollin, Policing the Police: Should Miranda Violations Bear Fruit?,
53 OHIO ST. L. J. 805, 846 (1992); Sangero, supra note 47, at 2800 (citing also the
position of Israeli Justice Dalia Dorner).
91. Seidmann & Stein, supra note 33, at 464.
92. WOLCHOVER & ARMSTRONG, supra note 68, at 11, 13 (stating that in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, grave doubts were raised in England as to
whether true remorse stood behind most confessions).
93. Sangero, supra note 47, at 2800 (emphasis omitted).
94. WOLCHOVER & ARMSTRONG, supra note 68, at 8–9; Defilippo, supra note
75, at 659, 672–73; Van Kessel, supra note 14, at 113. For a different opinion, in which
a confession is not decisive and its reliability is examined on its merits by a jury, see
LAUDAN, supra note 82, at 179–80.
95. Drizin & Leo, supra note 66, at 921.
96. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991) (quotation marks omitted).
97. Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 154
(1998).
98. Sangero, supra note 47, at 2815–16.
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neous statements.99 Confessions, therefore, cannot be divorced from the
way they are obtained.100 And to extract confessions, interrogators employ various tactics.
In interrogations, psychological manipulations constitute a primary
method of extracting confessions.101 There is the famous tactic of the
“good cop–bad cop,” which may be played by the same person.102 This
tactic plays on the suspect’s need for both love and punishment.103 Other
interrogative tactics also exert psychological pressure on suspects and
take advantage of their ignorance of the evidence against them.104 There
are various tactics of maximization.105 The key principle in these tactics is
to show confidence in the suspect’s guilt even without strong evidence.106
The interrogator tells the suspect that there is no point in denying guilt,
since the evidence is overwhelmingly incriminating, and, therefore, sufficient for conviction.107 Still, the interrogator wants to hear the suspect’s
side of the story in case there are mitigating circumstances.108 If the interrogators infer guilt from the suspect’s reactions (for example, the suspect
denies guilt in a weak tone of voice), the interrogator prevents the suspect from repeatedly denying guilt in order to not allow the suspect to
gain any psychological advantage.109 The interrogator may also reject all
explanations offered by the suspect as nonsense,110 demonstrating disappointment and dissatisfaction with the suspect’s answers.111 The interroga-

99. WOLCHOVER & ARMSTRONG, supra note 68, at 65.
100. Id.; see also Van Kessel, supra note 14, at 144 (“Perpetrators of crime generally do not walk into police stations and confess. Some initiative by police, such as
arrest and questioning, is usually necessary to obtain an admission.”).
101. Lopez, supra note 76, at 682; Laurie Magid, Deceptive Police Practices: How
Far Is Too Far?, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1168, 1198 (2001).
102. WOLCHOVER & ARMSTRONG, supra note 68, at 69; R. v. Oickle, [2000] 2
S.C.R. 3, section 103.
103. Donald A. Dripps, Foreword: Against Police Interrogation—And the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699, 705 (1988).
104. For a broad description of these tactics, see WOLCHOVER & ARMSTRONG,
supra note 68, at 68–79.
105. For this term, see Drizin & Leo, supra note 66, at 912.
106. WOLCHOVER & ARMSTRONG, supra note 68, at 69; White, supra note 65, at
151.
107. WOLCHOVER & ARMSTRONG, supra note 68, at 70.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 71.
110. Weisselberg, supra note 97, at 158; White, supra note 65, at 119–20.
111. WOLCHOVER & ARMSTRONG, supra note 68, at 77.
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tor may blame the suspect for a more serious offense,112 and try to belittle
him or her.113
Another common technique is to lie about the incriminating evidence against the suspect.114 Thus, the interrogator may say that the suspect failed the polygraph test, that the suspect’s accomplices confessed to
their guilt, that the suspect was identified by the victim as the perpetrator,
or that incriminating scientific evidence exists.115 Furthermore, the interrogator may try to persuade the suspect that his or her situation is hopeless.116 The interrogator may also attempt to convince the suspect of
having committed the crime even if the suspect does not remember it.117
Interrogators also employ different techniques to minimize the moral seriousness of the offense.118 An interrogator may demonstrate fake sympathy and understanding by: (1) stating that anyone in the same situation
would have reacted in a similar manner; (2) proposing a reasonable cause
for the offense; (3) condemning others; (4) flattering the suspect’s courage; or (5) making the suspect believe that he or she can learn from his or
her mistakes and that by confessing he or she will fare better in the
future.119
The power of these techniques to elicit confessions must be juxtaposed against the possibility of false confessions. The danger of false confessions is well-known today.120 The conventional wisdom that only guilty
suspects confess collapses in the face of reality.121 Innocent people with
average intellectual and cognitive powers have wrongly confessed to guilt
during interrogation.122 Researchers Leo and Ofshe estimate that “false

112. Id. at 73.
113. Id. at 79; Yale Kamisar, On the Fortieth Anniversary of the Miranda Case:
Why We Needed It, How We Got It—And What Happened to It, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 163, 187 (2007).
114. WOLCHOVER & ARMSTRONG, supra note 68, at 76; Hirsch, supra note 52, at
34–35; Ofshe & Leo, supra note 41, at 1008; Toney, supra note 65, at 430–31.
115. Young, supra note 48, at 429, 432.
116. Ofshe & Leo, supra note 41, at 986.
117. Id.
118. See Drizin & Leo, supra note 66, at 912.
119. JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH AND THE LAW 112 (1993);
WOLCHOVER & HEATON-ARMSTRONG, supra note 68, at 70; Dripps, supra note 103,
at 705; Young, supra note 48, at 431 (discussing a police interrogation manual that
suggests an interrogator may say to an accused rapist that it was indeed difficult to
avoid his act if he wanted to have intercourse with the woman raped).
120. ANDREW ASHWORTH, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS: AN EVALUATIVE STUDY
118 (1994); see also Feld, supra note 44, at 222; Sangero, supra note 47, at 2794.
121. See Leo & Ofshe, supra note 78, at 1143.
122. Drizin & Leo, supra note 66, at 920.
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confessions occur regularly.”123 There is no exact empirical data, nor can
there be, regarding false confessions in general, and false confessions that
led to wrongful convictions in particular, since it is impossible to expose
all such cases.124 Nevertheless, following the widely publicized exoneration (through the use of DNA evidence) of defendants who have falsely
confessed, the problem can no longer be ignored.125
In an era of psychological interrogations, when no physical pressure
is exerted, some are skeptical that interrogation techniques could lead an
innocent person to confess guilt, especially when the outcome could be
prolonged imprisonment, or even a life sentence.126 But the reality of police interrogations, unfamiliar to many of these skeptics, proves the falsity
of such intuitions.127 After all, modern interrogation techniques “intended
for the guilty . . . are psychologically powerful enough to elicit confessions from the innocent.”128 A continuous interrogation lasting several
hours in which various techniques of brainwashing are applied may cause
suspects to incriminate themselves out of despair.129 The pressure of extended and intensive interrogation may convince suspects that nobody
would believe their claims and that conviction was inevitable.130 Innocent
persons who confessed to having committed an offense have recounted
how they had been led to believe that their memory betrayed them.131
When an innocent person suspected of a crime faces what purports to be
strong scientific evidence, the individual may relinquish any hope of
maintaining his or her innocence.132
When police officers accuse someone of perpetrating a crime, they
then do their best to secure a confession, often using a variety of techniques to overwhelm the suspect’s autonomy, judgment, and self-inter-

123. Leo & Ofshe, supra note 78, at 1137.
124. Duke, supra note 86, at 566; Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 67, at 875; Leo
& Ofshe, supra note 67, at 431–32; Sangero, supra note 47, at 2797.
125. Drizin & Reich, supra note 88, at 634.
126. Drizin & Leo, supra note 66, at 910.
127. Id. at 910–11 .
128. Id. at 918.
129. For the use of brainwashing techniques, see Weisselberg, supra note 97, at
156; see also O. JOHN ROGGE, WHY MEN CONFESS 13–30 (1959).
130. See, e.g., R. v. Oickle, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, para. 49.
131. Gail Johnson, False Confessions and Fundamental Fairness: The Need for
Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 719, 719
(1997).
132. George C. Thomas III, Miranda’s Illusion: Telling Stories in the Police Interrogation Room, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1091, 1118 (2003) (reviewing WELSH S. WHITE, Miranda’s Waning Protections (2001)).
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est.133 All the techniques aimed at securing a confession that concerned
the Miranda Court weaken a suspect’s will to resist.134 These techniques,
when employed in custodial settings,135 may also be employed in non-custodial settings. Use of these techniques in non-custodial settings thus subverts the intent of Miranda and undermines the fundamental rights the
Court sought to protect.
III. THE PRESENCE OF COUNSEL IS ESSENTIAL TO
PROTECTING THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT AND IS
ALSO AN INDEPENDENT RIGHT
The right to protect oneself against self-incrimination obviously entails granting suspects a fair opportunity to exercise this right. In order to
have a fair opportunity, interrogators must inform the suspect explicitly
of the right to remain silent, of the right to counsel, and of the possible
ramifications of speaking. Even if the suspect is already aware of these
rights, the announcement itself clarifies that police intend to respect the
suspect’s rights, hence decreasing the coercive atmosphere of the interrogation somewhat.136 Theoretically, being apprised of these rights allows
suspects to understand the seriousness of their position and alerts them to
the need to make careful statements.137 Additionally, the assistance of
counsel who can explain the right to remain silent is necessary to maintaining that right.138
According to legal scholar Ronald Allen, the dispute around
Miranda could not be decided without solving the constant debate
between determinism and free will.139 That is, whether a suspect maintains
her ability to determine her conduct in spite of the circumstances, or
whether the circumstances themselves exert pressures such that
her will is overcome.140 A total inability to elect certain conduct is

133. See Mark A. Godsey, Shining the Bright Light on Police Interrogation in
America, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 711, 717 (2009).
134. See Bretz, supra note 9, at 239–40. In this regard, see Oregon v. Mathiason,
429 U.S. 492, 493 (1977) (the interrogator falsely told the suspect that his fingerprints
were found at the scene of the crime).
135. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 450–54 (1966).
136. See Julia C. Weissman, Modern Confession Law After Duckworth v. Eagan:
What’s the Use of Explaining, 66 IND. L.J. 825, 846 (1991); Stephen J. Schulhofer,
Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 446 (1987).
137. See Weissman, supra note 136, at 846.
138. See id. at 827.
139. Ronald J. Allen, Miranda’s Hollow Core, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 71, 76 (2006).
140. See id.
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rare.141 A driver who suffers a heart attack, loses control of the car, and
causes an accident may be an example of such a case. Normally, however,
a person retains this ability even though it may be very restricted, such as
when a person acts under duress.142 In these cases, we do not speak of an
inevitable choice, but of a choice that is severely restricted. We assume
that a reasonable person would not be able to overcome his or her fear of
death, and that this fear caused the individual to act unwillingly.143 In such
a case, “the volition of the moment is more or less opposed to the permanent trend of the will; the self of the moment is more or less in conflict
with the self as a whole.”144 Compulsion within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment is not tantamount to breaking the will, but it includes pressures that “overcom[e] the suspect’s unwillingness to talk.”145 In the context of confessions, the suspect’s free will is limited; though in the typical
case, the suspect has a range of choices.146 The presence of counsel expands the range of choices for the suspect.
Suspects may have good reasons to waive the right to remain silent.
Suspects are motivated to talk when they want to convince the police of
their innocence and believe in their ability to do so.147 Even a guilty per-

141. See Kamisar, supra note 113, at 165 (stating that all conscious utterances are
in some sense voluntary).
142. See A.K. Stout, Free Will and Responsibility, 37 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y
213, 220 (1937), reprinted in: READINGS IN ETHICAL THEORY 537, 542 (Wilfrid Sellars
& John Hospers eds., 1952); Albert W. Alschuler, Constraint and Confession, 74
DENV. U. L. REV. 957, 965–66 (1997).
143. Stout, supra note 142, at 222–23.
144. Id. at 223.
145. See Schulhofer, supra note 136, at 452.
146. See Kamisar, supra note 113, at 165; see also Allen, supra note 139, at 77 (“A
person who chooses to confess rather than endure yet more pain nonetheless chooses
to confess.”). Allen tends to think that there is no real free will since our actions are
dictated by “our genetic makeup and our past experiences.” Id. at 77–78. But certainly we make decisions despite our past experiences and learn to overcome internal
inhibitions. Furthermore, if, as Allen suggests, our genetic makeup and past experiences determine our conduct, then no criminal liability should be imposed on a
wrongdoer because the wrongdoer had no option to do otherwise. This theory of determinism is contrary to the fundamental ideas of our legal system regarding the ability to change one’s behavior and responsibility for one’s choice. See Michele Cotton,
A Foolish Consistency: Keeping Determinism Out of the Criminal Law, 15 B.U. PUB.
INT. L.J. 1, 1 (2005). Additionally, there is a philosophical opinion that the will is not a
consequence of reason, but is the very reason for one’s actions. That is, the will is not
subject to reason and explanation (YESHAIAHU LEIBOWITZ/TONY LAVI, HEAVEN,
ABOVE AND BELOW: PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUES 17 (1997) (Hebrew)). Allen’s provocative essay, however, undoubtedly stimulates thought.
147. See Paul Shechtman, An Essay on Miranda’s Fortieth Birthday, 10 CHAP. L.
REV. 655, 656 (2007); Thomas III, supra note 132, at 1095.
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son can believe in his ability to convince the police he is innocent by
lying.148 Many suspects prefer to convey their version of events in an attempt to convince police that they are not guilty.149 Some suspects talk in
order to learn what the police know about them.150 Giving one’s version
of events while waiving the right to silence can, then, act to the suspect’s
good. In contrast, waiving the right to silence without consulting with an
attorney is not normally an act redounding to this person’s best interests.151 Even an innocent suspect should prefer the advice of counsel.152
The assumption that lies at the base of Miranda is that the right to
confer with counsel is nothing else but an aspect of the right to remain
silent.153 The Miranda court based the suspect’s right to counsel in a custodial interrogation not on the adversarial right of representation itself,
but on a suspect’s right not to incriminate oneself.154 As stated previously,155 interrogation while in custody is coercive by its very nature and
exerts pressure on the suspect to talk.156 An attorney is necessary to provide a countervailing weight to this coercive force and to balance the psychological pressures that inhere in this atmosphere.157 The right to counsel
is necessary, therefore, in order to protect the suspect’s privilege against
self-incrimination while in custodial interrogation.
Furthermore, the right to counsel may be seen as an independent
right, rather than a right that serves only to support the right to remain
silent. In Escobedo v. Illinois, the Court stressed the right to representation by counsel as an independent right.158 In Escobedo, the police prevented a meeting between Escobedo, suspected of murdering his brotherin-law, and his attorney, despite repeated requests by Escobedo and his
attorney to meet.159 In ruling that Escobedo’s confession was inadmissible, the Escobedo verdict emphasized the adversarial nature of individual-state relations.160 The court attributed utmost importance to the point

148.
149.
at 656.
150.
151.
152.
randa’s
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

See Shechtman, supra note 147, at 656; Thomas III, supra note 147, at 1110.
See Schulhofer, supra note 136, at 448, 456–57; Shechtman, supra note 147,
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Shechtman, supra note 147, at 656.
Magid, supra note 101, at 1198.
Benjamin D. Cunningham, A Deep Breath Before the Plunge: Undoing MiFailure Before It’s Too Late, 55 MERCER L. REV. 1375, 1407 (2004).
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 466 (1966).
Id. at 467.
Supra, Part I.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
Id. at 466, 469.
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490–91 (1964).
Id. at 479–81.
Id. at 490–91 (relying on the Sixth Amendment).
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at which the person becomes a suspect or focus of interrogation.161 Two
years later, Miranda diverted the emphasis from the right to representation by counsel as an independent right to the right of a suspect not to
incriminate oneself.162 Miranda held that that constitutional protection
adheres only when a person is subject to custodial interrogation,163 emphasizing that the right to remain silent is the only right that is in danger
in custodial interrogations.164
Legal scholars have insisted, however, that the right to counsel during interrogation stems from the adversarial system.165 Being taken into
custody is generally, but not necessarily, the first stage in which the state
comes into confrontation with the individual.166 In fact, any suspect is in
an adversarial relationship with the state, even when not in custody. The
emphasis of the Miranda Court on the right to counsel as only supportive
of the right to silence fails to recognize the reality of when this adversarial
relationship begins.
Since a person’s adversarial relationship with the state begins at the
point the person becomes a suspect, an attorney’s advice is necessary at
any interrogation, not just one that takes place in a custodial situation.
Counsel can warn the suspect of possible interrogation tricks. Interrogators will be deterred more from using dubious means or from presenting the suspect with unreasonable demands when they know that the
suspect is represented by counsel.167 The attorney can explain the substantive law to the suspect.168 Additionally, counsel may shore up the suspect’s spirit.169 Anyone who has experienced aggressive cross-examination
in court can easily imagine the techniques at work to create confusion
and error in a suspect who is interrogated alone for hours, without coun161. Id. at 490 (“[T]he investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect”).
162. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 465–66.
163. Penney, supra note 37, at 367.
164. Id.
165. Weisselberg, supra note 97, at 142.
166. Cunningham, supra note 152, at 1410.
167. Robert K. Calhoun, Confessions and the Right to Counsel: Reflections on
Recent Changes in Turkish Criminal Procedure, 6 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 61,
63 (2000); Mark A. Godsey, Reformulating the Miranda Warnings in Light of Contemporary Law and Understanding, 90 MINN. L. REV. 781, 788 (2006); Link, supra note
16, at 897.
168. Rinat Kitai, A Custodial Suspect’s Right to the Assistance of Counsel—The
Ambivalence of Israeli Law Against the Background of American Law, 19 B.Y.U. J.
PUB. L. 205, 213 (2004).
169. See Mark Berger, Compromise and Continuity: Miranda Waivers, Confession
Admissibility, and the Retention of Interrogation Protections, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 1007,
1016 (1988); Godsey, supra note 167, at 796.

R
R
R

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\42-1\NMX105.txt

222

unknown

Seq: 20

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

11-JUN-12

12:49

[Vol. 42

sel, in a police station.170 The attorney’s role is to represent the suspect in
a difficult situation, make it clear that this individual will not face the
state alone, and to assist the suspect as his or her advocate. Thus, the
attorney closes the gap of power between the suspect and the state.171
An important aspect of this role is to explain to suspects their rights,
principally the right to remain silent. Arguably, it is sufficient that the
interrogators inform the suspect that he or she can put an end to the
interrogation at any given moment, or that the suspect is not obligated to
cooperate or respond to their questions. However, putting aside the tricks
interrogators employ to cause suspects to waive their rights,172 such advice
by police interrogators is not equivalent to advice by counsel. First, typically, an interrogator merely reads these rights to the suspect and no explanation of them is offered.173 There are even interrogators who briskly
continue the interrogation immediately after reading the Miranda warnings.174 When the suspect’s heart is beating with fear in anticipation of the
interrogation and its consequences, it is doubtful this person is able to
digest the significance of the police interrogator’s laconic pronouncement
of his rights. An attorney will not be satisfied just with an announcement
of these rights. Like a physician who does not inform a patient of the
possible types of treatment without explaining each of them and advising
on the preferred treatment, so, too, an attorney will explain these rights
to the suspect and advise whether the suspect should convey her version
of what happened, maintain silence, or otherwise cooperate.175 Obviously,
an attorney needs to hear the suspect’s story in order to give such proper
advice. Equally as obvious is the fact that the suspect will not feel free to
ask police interrogators questions, especially when those questions may
themselves be detrimental and incriminating.
Moreover, it is very difficult to rely on police interrogators to respond with objective answers to suspects’ questions about their rights.

170. Schulhofer, supra note 136, at 437.
171. Michael C. Mims, A Trap for the Unwary: The Sixth Amendment Right to
Counsel After Montejo v. Louisiana, 71 LA. L. REV. 345, 348 (2010) (discussing the
parity between the state and the accused achieved with the right to counsel).
172. Richard A. Leo, Criminal Law: The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 658–65 (1996) (discussing how interrogators use psychological tricks to convince suspects to waive their rights).
173. Cassell & Hayman, supra note 49, at 888 (explaining that interrogators generally read Miranda rights from written documents).
174. George C. Thomas III & Richard A. Leo, The Effects of Miranda v. Arizona:
“Embedded” in Our National Culture?, 29 CRIME & JUST. 203, 250 (2002).
175. See Joseph T. Thai, Constitutionally Excluded Confessions: Applying
America’s Lessons to a Democratic Iraq, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 37, 52 (2005); Van Kessel,
supra note 14, at 140.
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This is not because of ill will. Rather, there is an inherent conflict of interests between the interrogator’s desire to advance the investigation
through extracting an incriminating confession and the interrogator’s
duty to explain that the suspect has a right to refuse to cooperate in the
investigation.176
Thus, the right to counsel should be recognized at any interrogation.
An attorney’s presence is necessary to protect against the risk of coercion
and guarantee that making a statement reflects the suspect’s willingness
to talk. An attorney fulfills a special and irreplaceable role in defending
the suspect’s privilege against self-incrimination. In addition, because a
non-custodial interrogation is adversarial in the same way that custodial
interrogations are, the right to counsel is an independent right that should
adhere at the initiation of any interrogation. Finally, a situation in which a
suspect is exposed to long interrogation under pressure and without
counsel, even if non-custodial, undermines three central rationales that
underly the privilege against self-incrimination. These rationales are discussed in the next part.
IV. LIMITING MIRANDA WARNINGS TO CUSTODIAL
INTERROGATION SUBVERTS THREE RATIONALES
BEHIND THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT
Adversarial and inquisitorial criminal justice systems alike recognize
the accused person’s privilege not to speak.177 This privilege is also
granted to suspects and defendants accused of the most heinous crimes
before the International Criminal Court.178 Various rationales have been
offered to justify this common privilege.179 While there is no agreement
on the rationale(s) underlying the privilege,180 three rationales appear to

176. Penney, supra note 37, at 381; Van Kessel, supra note 14, at 106.
177. The nature of the inquisitorial proceedings, however, makes it difficult for
defendants to remain silent; judges can contact defendants directly, and they expect
defendants to tell their side of the story. JOHN HATCHARD ET AL., COMPARATIVE
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 32–33, 71–72 (1996); EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 24
(Mireille Delmas-Marty & J.R. Spencer eds., 2002); Renée Lettow Lerner, The Intersection of Two Systems: An American on Trial for an American Murder in the French
Cour D’assises, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 791, 824–25 (2001).
178. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 55(1)(a), 67(g), July
17 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
179. See generally David Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1063 (1986).
180. Id.
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be strong justifications for the privilege: bearing the burden of proof,181
avoiding the pooling effect,182 and the protection of the innocent.183 In
examining these rationales, it will be shown why these rationales warrant
providing Miranda warnings in any interrogation of a person as a suspect,
even when the suspect is not in custody.
A. Bearing the Burden of Proof
Good public policy requires that the prosecution bear the burden of
proof in establishing the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.184
Scholars conclude from the imposition of this heavy burden that the state
also has the obligation to obtain evidence independently of the accused
person’s own statements.185 Presumed innocent, the accused is under no
obligation to prove innocence or to explain behavior.186 The accused may
stand passive during the entire criminal process. Through silence, the accused person challenges the prosecution: “So prove your case, if you have
any.”
If the burden of proving innocence was on accused persons, they
would be compelled to choose between speaking and being convicted because in the typical case they would fail to meet the burden if they chose
to remain silent. Even if the burden remains on the state, when an ac181.

See JAMES C. MORTON & SCOTT C. HUTCHISON, THE PRESUMPTION OF IN112 (1987) (discussing the “bearing the burden of proof” rationale behind
the right to remain silent and stating that “[t]he presumption of innocence forms a
part of the broader privilege against self-incrimination. It is enough for an accused to
plead not guilty . . . . The Crown cannot secure a conviction until it has proven its
case—The Crown cannot rely on any expectation that the accused will testify”).
182. See SEIDMANN & STEIN, supra note 33, at 480 (discussing the “avoiding the
pooling effect” rationale behind the right to remain silent.); see also Alex Stein, The
Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A Response to Critics, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1115
(2008) (also discussing the “avoiding the pooling effect” rationale behind the right to
remain silent).
183. See MORTON & HUTCHISON, supra note 181, at 112–13 (discussing the “protection of the innocent” rationale behind the right to remain silent); Danny Ciraco,
Reverse Engineering, 11 WINDSOR REV. LEGAL & SOC. ISSUES 41, 67–68 (2001) (also
discussing the “protection of the innocent” rationale behind the right to remain
silent.).
184. Rinat Kitai, Protecting the Guilty, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1163 (2003).
185. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 692 (1993); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1,
8 (1964); SUSAN EASTON, THE CASE FOR THE RIGHT TO SILENCE 182 (2nd ed. 1998);
D.J. Harvey, The Right to Silence and the Presumption of Innocence, 1995 N.Z. L.J.
181, 182 (1995) (“Essential to the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof
is the concept that the prosecution should not resort to the accused for its proof.”).
186. STEFAN TRECHSEL, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 348 (2005);
Joseph C. Cascarelli, Presumption of Innocence and Natural Law: Machiavelli and
Aquinas, 41 AM. J. JURIS. 229, 230 (1996); Harvey, supra note 185, at 186.
NOCENCE
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cused is compelled to speak, the emphasis of the proceedings shifts from
the strength of the state’s case to the power of the accused’s response.
Thus, compelling the accused to speak does not reverse the burden of
proof, but it requires that the focus of the arguments at trial be on the
reasonability of the accused person’s story rather than on the sufficiency
of the evidence against the accused, hence undermining the notion that a
conviction should emanate from the prosecution’s evidence.187
Some scholars, however, refute the principle that requires the state
to prove its case without use of the accused’s assistance.188 They argue
that placing the burden on the prosecution to prove the accused person’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt does not require the prosecution to meet
this burden in a certain way, and does not ban relying on the accused
person for evidence.189 In civil proceedings, the defendant may be called
as a witness on the plaintiff’s behalf even though the burden to prove the
claim is cast upon the plaintiff.190 In criminal proceedings, the defendant,
who bears the burden of proof regarding certain defenses, may meet the
burden by relying upon the prosecution’s evidence.191 The burden of
proof does not lead necessarily, therefore, to a ban on compelling the
accused person to provide explanations for the incriminating evidence.
Criminal proceedings, however, involve a dynamic between the accused and the state that is absent from civil proceedings. Although civil
and criminal proceedings share the foundational notion that the one who
makes a claim ought to prove it in order to prevail, criminal cases also
involve the idea of the state as representative of society at large.192 The
state accuses the suspect of breaching the social compact.193 Although it is
a misconception that the accused person (even if guilty) is treated as an
enemy,194 the state nevertheless creates a conflict with the individual, and,
therefore, it cannot resort to its adversary for help. The state must fight
its own battle.

187. EASTON, supra note 185, at 182; Penney, supra note 37, at 378–79.
188. Dolinko, supra note 179, at 1084.
189. Id.
190. I.H. DENNIS, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 525–526 (3d ed. 2007) (among the litigants in trial, only the defendant in a criminal trial is not compellable as a witness);
see also Donald A. Dripps, Foreword: Against Police Interrogation—And the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 78 J. CRIM. & CRIMINOLOGY 699, 721 (1988) (“no one
suggests a privilege against testifying contrary to interest in civil cases”).
191. Mancini v. D.P.P, [1942] A.C. 1, 12, 13.
192. Mugambi Jouet, Reconciling the Conflicting Rights of Victims and Defendants at the International Criminal Court, 26 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 249, 255 (2007);
Margaret L. Paris, Why It Matters, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 495, 500 (2001).
193. Kitai, supra note 184.
194. Young, supra note 48, at 460.
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Thus, the expectation that a person will serve simultaneously as accuser and accused upsets the relationship between the individual and the
state.195 The normal procedure in criminal proceedings is that the state
accuses and those accused defend themselves. Coerced speech is antithetical to this structure. As discussed,196 counsulting with an attorney enables
suspects to fulfill their right to silence because the knowledge that the
suspect is represented may deter the police from acting illegally, and the
attorney may encourage the suspect’s spirit and assist him or her in coping with the interrogation and the detention. Therefore, counsel at the
pretrial stage is necessary to ensure that the state would not bear its burden of proof by extracting a confession from the accused person against
his will.
B. Sorting the Truth from the Lies: Avoiding the Pooling Effect by
Ensuring the Right to Remain Silent
A relatively new theory by Alex Stein and Daniel Seidmann claims
that, absent the right to silence, guilty suspects would lie.197 Lies by guilty
suspects create what they call “the pooling effect.”198 The pooling effect is
created when the frequency of lies told by guilty suspects, who do not
have the option of silence, causes excuses by innocent defendants who
cannot corroborate their story to sound like lies to interrogators and
prosecutors. The more lies there are, the greater the pooling effect.199
According to this theory, the right to silence can lead to fewer
wrongful convictions when examining the chances of convicting an innocent person in the absence of a right to silence, from an ex ante perspective, when the evidence of guilt is of intermediate strength.200 In this
theory, the right to silence is justified in that it allocates the risks of error
in a criminal trial in a manner that reduces the rate of wrongful convictions at the cost of increasing the number of erroneous acquittals.201 The
pooling-effect theory shares the well-accepted assumption that only guilty
persons invoke the right to silence.202 According to this view, rational innocent persons will speak up, whereas guilty persons may prefer to main195. CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 31 (Henry Paolucci
trans., 1963) (making this statement in the context of torture).
196. See supra notes and text accompanying notes 164–188.
197. See Seidmann & Stein, supra note 33.
198. Id. at 433.
199. Id. at 433, 449.
200. Id. at 456, 461–62; see also ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW
157–67 (2005); Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A Response to
Critics, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1115 (2008).
201. Seidmann & Stein, supra note 33, at 455.
202. Id. at 444, 452.
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tain silent, since it is abundantly clear that guilty persons wish to conceal
the truth, whereas innocent persons wish to reveal the truth.203 If suspects
remain silent, we assume that they are guilty.204
In this view, the right to silence helps to distinguish between factually guilty persons and factually innocent persons.205 It is rational for
guilty persons to remain silent rather than lie, since lies may be positively
refuted, and disclosures may complicate matters for accused persons and
remove all reasonable doubt as to their guilt.206 In contrast, silence cannot
eliminate a reasonable doubt that arises from the evidence.207 Therefore,
in the absence of a right to silence, many criminals would choose the option of lying, creating an effect whereby the volume of lies overwhelms
the explanations of the innocent.208 If, for example, twenty of every 100
suspects remain silent and eighty talk—forty of whom are innocent and
forty of whom are guilty—abolishing the right to silence would result in
sixty guilty persons who talk. Of those that talk, the majority (forty out of
sixty) would lie, so proportionately more false stories would be heard.
The increase in false stories increases the risk that innocent persons who
cannot provide external evidence to corroborate their stories will be convicted.209 This is because, given awareness of the incentive for criminals to
lie, the investigator’s inclination will be to treat the stories of accused
persons with suspicion and to give little credence to an uncorroborated
exculpatory statement, an outcome that will harm innocent persons.210
When statements of accused people cannot be corroborated, abolishing the right to silence will create a tendency to treat all stories uniformly as unreliable.211 Stein and Seidmann assume that, in such a
circumstance, suspects who have a strong alibi will not be harmed; rather,
the requirement to speak would affect innocent suspects who offer an
excuse that a liar could tell with the same degree of success, such as: “I
was at home, and spoke with no one,” or, in a rape accusation, “she consented.”212 When police, prosecutors, and judges repeatedly hear the
same uncorroborated version of innocence, they tend to treat such statements and protestations of innocence more suspiciously than if they have

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

JEREMY BENTHAM, A TREATISE ON JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 241 (1825).
Seidmann & Stein, supra note 33, at 444, 446.
Id. at 433.
Id. at 443.
Id. at 449.
Id. at 433, 439.
Id. at 457–58.
Id. at 480.
Id. at 462.
Id. at 459.
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heard it rarely or less often.213 Guilty suspects who can legally remain
silent waive the practical, although illegal, alternative of lying. In so doing, they help prevent a “pooling” effect and reduce the risk that an innocent person will be convicted.214
From their point of departure that silence attests to guilt, Stein and
Seidmann advance the position that it is wrong to apply pressure on
criminals to lie instead of remain silent.215 Such pressure, they believe,
may act to the detriment of innocent persons who provide a story,
thereby imposing on them negative externalities.216 The right to silence
may be justified in light of the assumption that criminals are the ones who
make use of it, and, therefore, the right helps distinguish between guilty
and innocent persons, to the benefit of the latter.
The avoidance of the pooling effect as a justification of the privilege
against self-incrimination is not bereft of difficulties. First, some may argue that the pooling effect is marginal. Since there is no situation in which
all guilty suspects remain silent and all innocent persons talk, and since
there is incriminating evidence against both innocent and guilty persons,
a pooling effect exists from the very fact that one person is a suspect.
Interrogators may tend to treat any story by an accused person with suspicion.217 Insofar as it is dependent on whether or not interrogators hear
forty or sixty false stories, the effect on an innocent person of whether the
interrogator believes the story is marginal. Usually a case will not be decided based on the question of whether or not the interrogator believes
the suspect’s alibi, but on the basis of the other evidence in the file. Second, the assumption that without the right to silence a guilty person’s lies
would implicate him or her implies that an innocent person would be
saved from wrongful conviction in the guilty person’s stead.218
Third, for a significant pooling effect to occur, there must be a large
number of guilty people who forego the right to silence and lie. Deontological arguments, such as the duty imposed on the state to prove guilt
from independent sources without assistance from the accused person,
are valid justifications for the right to silence even if only one suspect
from among all suspects chooses to exercise the right. According to the

213. This emanates from the pooling-effect theory. See id. at 460–61.
214. Id. at 457–58.
215. Id. at 449.
216. Id.
217. See Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel
Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 292, 305, 340.
218. See Gordon Van Kessel, Quieting the Guilty and Acquitting the Innocent: A
Close Look at a New Twist on the Right to Silence, 35 IND. L. REV. 925, 966
(2001–2002).
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pooling-effect theory, when fewer guilty suspects invoke the right to silence than lie, the danger that the abolition of the right to silence would
create the pooling effect is blurred, up to the point of near negligibility.
Thus, one study found that only 4 percent of the suspects chose to invoke
their rights during custodial questioning.219 There is other data regarding
different times and places,220 but the point is that the pooling effect is
significantly different when there are, for example, four excuplatory
statements as opposed to fifty exculpatory statements. If it is empirically
proven that the pooling effect, as the result of abolition of the right to
silence, is insignificant (for instance, if after public criticism of accused
persons who remain silent a reduction occurs in the exercise of the right),
then it would be very difficult to justify the right to silence under this
theory.
Despite these reservations, the pooling effect is an interesting theory. According to this theory, the pooling effect exists in every interrogation of a person as a suspect, whether or not he or she is under arrest. If
we want to encourage guilty suspects to remain silent rather than lie, and
thereby avoid the negative impact of the pooling effect, suspects should
be apprised of their right to silence and their right to consult with an
attorney.221 Allowing guilty people to remain silent would permit the explanations of innocent people to be heard better without the clouding
impact of the pooling effect.
C. The Truth Shall Set You Free? The Right to Silence Protects the
Innocent
“Death and life are in the power of the tongue.”222 But is it true that
a guilty person’s speaking would lead to destruction, whereas an innocent
person’s speaking would lead to absolution? Under the traditional argument of the cruel trilemma, choosing among self-accusation, perjury, or

219.
220.

Cassell & Hayman, supra note 49, at 859–60.
Roger Leng, The Right to Silence Debate in: SUSPICION AND SILENCE: THE
RIGHT TO SILENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 25 (David Morgan & Geoffrey M.
Stephenson eds. 1994) (fifty-seven percent of the represented suspects; twenty-two
percent of the unrepresented suspects); Richard A. Leo, Criminal Law: Inside the
Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 286 (1996) (twenty-two
percent).
221. Stein and Seidmann note that their theory allows adverse inferences from
pre-arrest silence only under circumstances “similar to res gestae.” Seidmann & Stein,
supra note 33, at 489. However, in other non-custodial situations, then, “the self-incrimination privilege is necessary as an incentive for guilty suspects to separate themselves from innocent ones through silence.” Id.
222. Proverbs 18:21.
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contempt of court, silence warrants the conclusion of guilt, since only
guilty persons may benefit from its use.223
However, the assumption that rational guilty persons want to remain silent, whereas rational innocent persons want to talk, is an excessively broad generalization that does harm to the innocent. It is difficult
to disagree with the assumption that guilty persons generally want to conceal the truth while innocent persons generally want to reveal the truth.
But the statement that guilty persons want to remain silent while innocent persons want to talk in order to absolve themselves of guilt represents a conceptual leap unjustified by reality. In practice, most suspects—
the guilty among them—choose to provide a story because of both the
psychological pressure that is exerted by their interrogators and the natural need to try to remove the suspicions against them.224 Thus, even if we
conclude that it is preferable for a rational guilty suspect who does not
have a convincing story to remain silent, most suspects do not behave this
way.
The perception that innocent people prefer to talk—since their natural response is to protest the false accusation leveled at them—is also
not well-founded. An innocent person may have a strong incentive to remain silent for reasons unrelated to any desire to conceal a crime.225 Silence may emanate from the will to preserve one’s privacy, to evade
embarrassment, to protect one’s security, or to cover-up for another person.226 Because of the difficult psychological situation in which the suspect
is found during interrogation, the individual may be paralyzed from crying out his or her innocence because of a feeling of helplessness, confusion, tension, shock, anger or insult engendered by the very existence and
nature of the interrogation and the fact that the interrogators do not believe the suspect’s story. Different people react differently to the same
circumstances. Take, for example, Billy Budd, the protagonist of Herman
Melville’s story, who was not able to speak in the face of the false and
malicious accusation that Claggart, the ship’s master-of-arms, threw in his
face:
“Speak, man!” said Captain Vere to the transfixed one, struck by
his aspect even more than by Claggart’s. “Speak! Defend your-

223. Dolinko, supra note 188, at 1093; William J. Stuntz, Self-Incrimination and
Excuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1239 (1988).
224. Thomas III, supra note 147, at 1108; Amanda L. Prebble, Note, Manipulated
by Miranda: A Critical Analysis of Bright Lines and Voluntary Confessions Under
United States v. Dickerson, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 555, 578–79 (2000).
225. Ciraco, supra note 183, at 60.
226. Id. at 61.
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self!” Which appeal caused but a strange dumb gesturing and gurgling in Billy; amazement at such an accusation so suddenly
sprung on inexperienced nonage; this, and, it may be, horror of
the accuser’s eyes, serving to bring out his lurking defect and in
this instance for the time intensifying it into a convulsed tonguetie; while the intent head and entire form straining forward in an
agony of ineffectual eagerness to obey the injunction to speak and
defend himself, gave an expression to the face like that of a condemned vestal priestess in the moment of being buried alive, and
in the first struggle against suffocation.227

Moreover, an innocent suspect may prefer to provide a false story if,
in that person’s opinion, the truthful version is difficult to verify or may
complicate matters rather than resolve them.228 For instance, in the case
of a barroom brawl, it is reasonable to assume that some of the people
who had no connection whatsoever to the brawl would prefer to deny the
fact that they had been present at the time of the incident either for fear
of being accused or for fear of getting involved in a trial against another
person.
However, the right to silence may directly, not only indirectly, protect an innocent person from a wrongful conviction.229 An innocent suspect may simply forget things, and provide inaccurate statements because
of memory weakness.230 An innocent person may be convicted at trial
owing to reliance on confused or inaccurate statements made as a result
of absentmindedness or lack of concentration, or even because his or her
words could be interpreted in more than one way.231 Police do not systematically reveal incriminating evidence against the suspect at the interrogation stage, and, hence, the suspect may lack the opportunity to give a
coherent story to explain away the evidence.232 The tension and pressure

227. HERMAN MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD AND OTHER STORIES 349 (Penguin Books
1986) (1924).
228. WOLCHOVER & ARMSTRONG, supra note 68, at 113; Ciraco, supra note 183,
at 61. See, e.g., Robert P. Mosteller, Patching the System: The Next Steps in Reform:
Protecting the Innocent: Part of the Solution for Inadequate Funding for Defenders,
Not a Panacea for Targeting Justice, 75 MO. L. REV. 931, 943–44 (2010) (providing a
false alibi by an innocent person).
229. Leng, supra note 220, at 27.
230. On the weakness of memory generally, see Steven B. Duke, Ann Seung-Eun
Lee & Chet K.W. Peger, A Picture’s Worth a Thousand Words: Conversational Versus
Eyewitness Testimony in Criminal Convictions, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 15–16 (2007).
231. For such instances, see Findley & Scott, supra note 217, at 338.
232. See Rinat Kitai-Sangero, Due Process at the Pretrial Detention Stage—What
Will Become of the Innocent? A Call for Pretrial Discovery Rules, 46 CRIM. L. BULL.
452, 453 (2010).
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of an interrogation, as well as the fear and excitement of the proceedings,
may also lead to contradictions and self-incriminating responses.233 The
accused person’s knowledge of his or her own innocence does not necessarily act to lessen the fear or even paranoia.234 Furthermore, not all innocent suspects are able to provide proper explanations.235 In such
circumstances, it is easy to put words into the interrogated person’s
mouth. Interrogation tactics may cause an innocent person to believe that
the other side is acting against him or her and force him into a defensive
posture. Consequently, an innocent person may think that the chances of
exoneration increase with the choice to remain silent.
Scholars assume that a rational innocent person has an interest in
telling the truth.236 According to this view, exercise of the right to silence
or lying because of the fear of a wrongful conviction is irrational because
it does harm to the innocent person’s interest to be acquitted at trial.237
Proponents of this view believe it is preferable for an innocent person to
provide a true account of events, since only in the most extreme circumstances will the true story fail to create, at the very least, a reasonable
doubt of guilt.238 Moreover, they claim that the hypothesis regarding the
irrational behavior during interrogation is not supported empirically.239
These scholars support the idea that silence does not protect the innocent; on the contrary, they believe it strengthens the suspicions against
them.240 Avoiding giving an explanation, in this view, is risky for the
innocent.
Human behavior and legal dynamics belie this optimistic view. First,
people do not always behave rationally.241 As discussed in Part II,242 in
some cases, innocent people not only do not protest against the false accusations, but they also confess to crimes that they did not commit. If we
accept that innocent people can confess to a crime, why is it unacceptable

233. Akhil Reed Amar & Renée B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles:
The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 900–901 (1995).
234. Hirsch, supra note 52, at 51–52.
235. Leng, supra note 220, at 33.
236. Seidmann & Stein, supra note 33, at 444, 466–67.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 444, 466–67.
239. Stein, supra note 200, at 1131; see also Seidmann & Stein, supra note 33, at
450.
240. K.W. Lidstone & T.L. Early, Questioning Freedom: Detention for Questioning in France, Scotland and England, 31 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 488, 509 (1982).
241. See Fydor Dostoyevsky, Notes from the Underground (Richard Pevear &
Larissa Volokhonsky trans., Vintage Books 1994) (1864) (demonstrating ingeniously
how people do not always behave rationally).
242. See supra Part II and notes and text accompanying notes 132–145.
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that they choose silence? Irrational behavior often occurs under interrogation: “Police interrogation is a stressful situation that may call forth
strange reactions.”243 Second, our legal system recognizes the the autonomy of an individual’s right to conduct the defense that seems fit to him
or her. Third, the assumption that the true story will act to the benefit of
an innocent person by undermining the body of seemingly incriminating
evidence is overly optimistic. In many cases an innocent person was close
enough to the incident or knows about it such that his or her responses
may cause the interrogators not to believe the exculpatory aspects of the
story and may bring about self-incrimination.244 Take, for example, a case
in which an innocent person has been mistakenly identified as the attacker. If this person admits to being at the scene of the incident, to
standing in proximity to those involved in the skirmish, and to having a
knife, which was taken away by someone there, these true statements
may only add to the incriminating evidence. Namely, this person was at
the scene when the brawl took place and the suspect’s own knife was used
to stab the victim.
A good example that illustrates how statements made by suspects in
their own defense may be used against them is the Israeli case of Margalit
Har-Shefi.245 Har-Shefi was convicted of the offense of not preventing the
commission of a felony and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment.246
The Israeli Supreme Court decreed that she knew of Yigal Amir’s intention to murder Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, but, contrary to statute, did
not report this to the police.247 Har-Shefi admitted that Amir had told her
that he intended to murder Prime Minister Rabin.248 She claimed, though,
that she did not take his statements seriously, but viewed them as part of
the many theoretical debates that she had previously had with Amir.249
Jewish law includes din rodef (the law of the pursuer), which allows a
person to kill someone if that person is attempting to kill you or another
person.250 Amir claimed that din rodef applied to someone who intended
to hand over territory from the Land of Israel to non-Jews.251 Har-Shefi
asserted that she did not share Amir’s opinion that this law applied to

243. William J. Stuntz, Miranda’s Irrelevance: Miranda’s Mistake, 99 MICH. L.
REV. 875, 987 (2001).
244. Amar & Lettow, supra note 233, at 874.
245. CA 3417/99 Har-Shefi v. State of Israel, 55(2) PD 735 [2001] (Isr.).
246. Id. at section 10.
247. Id. at section 95.
248. Id. at section 95–97.
249. Id.
250. Id. at section 63–65.
251. Id. at sections 62–63.
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Prime Minister Rabin, and that she had argued with him on this matter.252
She claimed that she would have tried to prevent Amir from fulfilling his
intentions had she been aware that he was serious.253 As proof, Har-Shefi
said that she had approached a rabbi in her settlement of Beit-El for help
in dealing with the points raised by Amir from the perspective of Jewish
law.254 The Israeli Supreme Court used this fact as a central reason for
upholding Har-Shefi’s conviction, ruling that her discussion with the
rabbi attested to the fact that she had known of Yigal Amir’s intention to
murder the prime minister.255 Thus, as this case illustrates, if a suspect is
close enough to the event, there is a fear that the defense’s argument will
be used against this person. Therefore, innocent people may incriminate
themselves when they tell the truth; such cases are not so exceptional and
the common belief that an innocent person would not be hurt by telling
the truth is wrong, and dangerous.256
Additionally, persons may be inaccurate in describing events. Imagine reporting to a friend about a debate with your boss or about breaking
up with a boyfriend or girlfriend. Would the story you tell change from
friend to friend, from time to time? Would you sometimes omit details,
exaggerate others? It is often a natural human characteristic to do so.
During an interrogation, however, every omission, every exaggeration,
every lie that is caught would act to undermine one’s credibility, shake
one’s confidence, and create the impression that the one’s guilt is a
proven fact.
The discussion in this subsection indicates that it is impossible to
discount cases—even if they do not reflect the norm—in which the right
to silence is an essential tool for innocent persons to improve their
chances of avoiding indictment or being acquitted at trial. The fact that it
is impossible, under certain circumstances, to discount the contribution of
the right to silence to the defense of an innocent person is enough to
justify its existence. The cruel trilemma argument that is conceived as a
defense for the guilty is also valid for the innocent who fears that his or
her responses may lead to self-incrimination. The right to silence also
supports the ability of the accused person to conduct his defense in the
most appropriate way that, in his opinion, will avoid conviction. An attorney is the most appropriate figure to advise the individual to remain silent and in doing so may save an innocent suspect from wrongful
conviction.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Id. at section 65.
Id. at section 10.
Id. at section 72.
Id.
Ciraco, supra note 183, at 67–68.
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V. CONCLUSION
Every interrogation of a person suspected of a crime should trigger
a Miranda warning. Announcing to the suspect that he or she is not under
arrest and is free to terminate the interrogation at any time is insufficient
to protect against coerced self-incrimination. When police interrogators
focus their efforts upon a person suspected of a crime, that person is subject to a whole range of techniques aimed at securing a confession and
that often convey the message that a claim of innocence will be ignored.
Silence under such circumstances could be a means of defense, and may
save an innocent suspect from making inaccurate statements or from
making a confession out of despair. A defense attorney is the principal
safeguard to protect a suspect’s privilege against self-incrimination in police interrogation. Denying Miranda warnings to suspects in a non-custodial setting conflicts with the main rationales underlying the Fifth
Amendment.
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